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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
will pay no more than the amount required to insure these fixed payments according to actuarial tables as they existed when the contract was entered into.
Plaintiff's other contention, that he should not have to pay for the probationary period, was rejected on the ground that in computing the deficiencies
some mathematical inconsistancies must occur, but since plaintiff was given
credit for that period when his appointment was back dated to September of
1942 he was not prejudiced.
The Court in the instant case reached a result which is not only logical
and reasonable, but undoubtedly conforms with the legislative intent. Dunn
was not forced to pay any more than he would have paid had he actually
became a fireman in September of 1942, and contributed for twenty years.
In fact, the city has paid ti contribution for the four years while he was in
service. Plaintiff received four years credit and was in no way prejudiced by
being required to make up the deficiency necessary to keep the pension fund
actuarially sound.
JUDGMENT OF JURY NOT TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR DETERMINATION OF CITY'S

BOARD OF SAFETY

In the consolidated cases, Weiss v. Fote and Alexander v. Fote,'8 actions
to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a collision between two
automobiles at an intersection, the plaintiff Weiss, a pedestrian, sued the drivers
of both cars, Alexander and Fote, and also the City of Buffalo. The driver,
Alexander, sued Fote and the City of Buffalo. Both the Supreme Court of
Erie County and the Appellate Division found for the plaintiffs, 17 but only
against the defendant City of Buffalo and not against the allegedly negligent
automobile operators.
The negligence liability of the defendant City was predicated on the
theory that at the intersection where the accident occurred, the traffic signal
designed by the Board of Safety of the City of Buffalo did not have a sufficient
"clearance interval." Allegedly the four second interval of time between
the end of the green signal for east-west traffic and the beginning of the green
signal for north-south traffic was too short to allow the intersection to be
safely cleared of cars from one direction before inviting cars to procede from
the other direction and hence the design or plan of the traffic light was a proximate cause of the accident.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments against the City of Buffalo
and dismissed the complaints,' 8 holding that in the absence of some indication
that due care was not exercised in the prepaiation of the design, or that no
reasonable official could have accepted it, a jury verdict as to the reasonableness
of the time interval involved may not be substituted for the previous determination of that question by the legally authorized Board of Safety.
16.
17.
18.

7 N.Y.2d 579, 200 N.Y.S2d 409 (1960).
8 A.D.2d 692, 186 N.Y.S.2d 233 (4th Dep't 1959).
Supra note 16.
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In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Desmond characterized the
decision as 1... a long and surprising step backward into the old, abandoned
area of governmental immunity." 9
New York has waived its "sovereign immunity" from suit to a greater
extent than any other State or the United States itself.2° Section 8 of the
New York Court of Claims Act reads:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and consents
to have the same determined in' accordance with the same rules of law
as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this
article.
A problem arises when the State is sued for activity in which no individual
or corporationother than the State or its agents can engage. The broad waiver
of immunity in Section 8 has never been read to apply to acts of the Legislature
in making a law which results in harm to someone, nor to the Chief Executive
or a judge exercising his discretion, no matter what the negligently inflicted
harm may be. Nor is their any question that the State is liable for the negligence of its employees on the purely operational level, as when a garbage
truck negligently driven by a city employee is involved in a collision.
On the one hand, public policy and our division of government into three
branches demand that not every action by an inferior official and agency be
subject to judicial review and the possible substitution of the judge's or jury's
decision for that of the official. On the other hand, public servants are neither
infallible nor impeccable, and it is the business of the court to redress injuries
tortiously caused.
In attempting to formulate rules which will adequately take care of both
considerations, which will include the State's liability for an auto accident
and its immunity for a judge's magisterial decision, which will take care of the
cases which fall in between the two extremes, which will take care of acts
which are quasi-judicial, or semi-discretionary, or partly operational, or mainly
administrative, the work of commissions, committees, boards, experts, minor
officials, in short, as the Court attempts to deal with government's interaction
with people on a day to day personal level, the distinctions drawn by the courts
in fixing or denying liability have up to this point broken down when extended
beyond the fact situation of-the case in which they -were articulated.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter commented in India Towing Co. v. United States,
...
the Government . . . would thus push the courts into the 'non-governmental'--'governmental' quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal
corporations. A comparative study of the cases in the forty-eight States will
disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More than that, the decisions in each of the
19. Id. at 589, 200 N.Y.S.2d 416.
20. Herzog, Liability of the State of- New York For "Purely Governmental" Functions, 10 Syracuse L. Rev. 30 (1958).
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States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to
apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound." 2' 1
The instant case does little to preserve us from the "quagmire" referred to
by Frankfurter. Both Fuld in the majority opinion and Desmond in the dissent
are able to cite a multitude of cases as controlling.
According to the majority, the leading case in this area is Urquart v. City
of Ogdensburg which says:
The rule is well settled that where power is conferred on public
officers or a municipal corporation to make improvements, such as
streets, sewers, etc., and keep them in repair, the duty to make them is
quasi judicial or discretionary, involving a determination as to their
necessity, requisite capacity, location, etc., and for failure to exercise
this power or an erroneous estimate of the public needs, no civil action
can be maintained3P
This case, and the cases which follow it, rest immunity of the State on the
policy of maintaining the administration of municipal affairs in the hands of
state or municipal executive officers as against the incursion of courts and
juries. This line of cases does not rest the immunity of the State on the sovereign
character of its governmental function and consequently the waiver by the
State of its sovereign immunity does not thereby waive any immunity which
it might derive from another source.
How do we distinguish sovereign immunity from some other type of governmental immunity? No definitive pattern has yet emerged, however two
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, Dalehite v. United Statesm
as modified by India Towing Co. v. United States,2 4 together with the instant

case, seem to establish that even where the State has waived its sovereign immunity it may not be held culpable for decisions made at the planning level
rather than at the operational level.
The State or municipality in circumstances like the instant case would be
liable if the accident were caused by improper maintenance of the traffic light 2 5
Perhaps the whole area is better approached in terms of "duty." A
municipality owes the public a duty of keeping its streets in a reasonably
safe condition for travel. Included in this duty is the subordinate duty to plan
intersections and for failure to plan or to review a plan when it is shown to be
unsafe, the municipality may be liable. 28 The duty to plan, however, is not a
duty to plan correctly or wisely, but only a duty to try to plan correctly or
wisely.
Perhaps, again, the real rationale behind the instant case, and those like
21. 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955).
22. 91 N.Y. 67, 71 (1883).

23. 346 US. 15 (1953).

24. Supra note 21.
25. Murphy v. De Revere, 304 N.Y. 922, 110 N.E.2d 740 (1953).
26. Eastman v. State of New York, 303 N.Y. 691, 103 N.E.2d 56 (1951).
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it, is none of the lofty and nebulous considerations given above, but simply a
refusal of the Court to prefer a jury verdict as to the reasonableness of a traffic
plan to the considered decision of an expert government body which, under
the evidence adduced at the trial, carefully executed a traffic safety plan which
operated without a hitch for over three years previous to the accident which
it allegedly caused.
Whatever the reasoning behind the decision in the instant case, the chaos
in this section of the law should give one pause before relying on it as binding
precedent in any but an identical fact situation.

PROPERTY
REQUIREMENTS FOR COVENANTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND

In Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp.,' the plaintiff and defendant's
predecessor in title entered into an agreement whereby the latter was to supply
steam heat to a building on the plaintiff's property and to furnish and maintain
pipes for that purpose. Plaintiff agreed to pay $50.00 yearly and allow the
defendant's predecessor to build a spur track across his land. The agreement
provided that it applied to the heirs and assignees of the parties. For twentyseven years, the defendant's predecessor provided the heat in fulfillment of
its covenant. In 1956, a series of conveyances took place which formed the
basis of the present action. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the
original covenantor, The Embossing Co. (defendant's predecessor in title), had
contracted to sell its land to an agent of the defendant, who agreed to assume
the obligation to supply heat. He, in turn, assigned the contract of sale to
another agent of defendant, who also assumed the burden of the covenant to
provide heat, and to whom the land was deeded as grantee. Subsequently, the
land was reconveyed, this time to the defendant, in an agreement making no
mention of the obligation to provide heat. Upon the defendant's refusal to
perform the covenant, the plaintiff brought an action for specific performance
and damages. The defendant contended that the action had become academic,
since the plaintiff had sold his own land to the defendant. The Court of
Appeals, although agreeing that the question of specific performance was moot,
held that the plaintiff might properly litigate the question of damages.
The Appellate Division affirmed an order of the Supreme Court dismissing
the plaintiff's complaint, holding that the covenant to supply heat was not one
which may run with the land, since it was affirmative in nature.2 The Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the covenant ran with the land and so was
enforceable against a subsequent grantee. In addition, the Court held that the
assumption agreement between The Embossing Co. and defendant's alleged
1. 7 N.Y.2d 240, 196 N.YS.2d 945 (1959).
2. 6 A.D.2d 627, 180 N.Y.S.2d 535 (3d Dep't 1958).

